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Abstract
We develop a correspondence between the theory of sequential algo-
rithms and classical reasoning, via Kreisel’s no-counterexample interpre-
tation. Our framework views realizers of the no-counterexample inter-
pretation as dynamic processes which interact with an oracle, and allows
these processes to be modelled at any given level of abstraction. We dis-
cuss general constructions on algorithms which represent specific patterns
which often appear in classical reasoning, and in particular, we develop
a computational interpretation of the rule of dependent choice which is
phrased purely on the level of algorithms, giving us a clearer insight into
the computational meaning of proofs in classical analysis.
1 Introduction
The extraction of programs from proofs is an old and well developed concept.
Ever since Hilbert’s program, the connection between logic and computation
has been a cornerstone of research in the foundations of mathematics and
theoretical computer science, which has led to the construction of a large variety
of formal interpretations that map proofs in a given system to terms which
represent their computational content. The no-counterexample interpretation
[10, 11], Dialectica interpretation [5] andmodified realizability [12] are examples
of these.
However, while interpretations give us a general procedure for extracting
terms from proofs, actually understanding how those terms behave as algo-
rithms is an entirely different matter. The reason for this is clear: since the
structure of extracted terms reflects the formal structure of the proof from
which they were obtained, their salient features as programs lie hidden under
a layer of syntax which accounts for every tiny logical step in the proof. Even
the simplest proofs can yield programs whose behaviour is not at all obvious
at first glance (see the study of the drinkers paradox carried out in [22]), and
those which make use of non-trivial classical principles such as the axiom of
choice can be enormous (one of the first programs [16] extracted from a proof
of Higman’s lemma took up 12MB of computer code!).
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More recent developments in the theory of program extraction have sought
to address this problem. Classical realizability [15], for example, makes use of
a machine model which in particular allows a direct interpretation of classical
reasoning via control operators, thus giving a more algorithmic account of
programs obtained from classical proofs. In addition, refinements to traditional
techniques have led to the extraction of much more efficient programs from
proofs: see for instance [1] or [24]. Nevertheless, these approaches are all
fundamentally formal, and involve a direct translation from proofs to terms.
In this paper, we take a different approach. We focus on the production not
of terms in some formal language, but of high-level descriptions of algorithms. In
doing so, we propose a technique of program extraction which combines both
formal and informal reasoning: appealing to human intuition in conjunction
with powerful formal constructions on algorithmswhich are inspired by proof-
theoretic techniques.
To be more precise, we develop a simple and very general kind of oracle
transition system, inspired by Gurevich’s notion of a sequential time algorithm
[6]. This models a class of algorithms which operate on some underlying
state, and allow explicit queries to some ‘mathematical environment’. We set
up a correspondence between sequential algorithms and Kreisel’s famous no-
counterexample interpretation, whereby an algorithm represents a realizer of
the n.c.i. of some formula iff elements of its end state satisfy the quantifier-free
part of that formula. Though in this paper we work primarily with the n.c.i.,
together with aspects of the Dialectica interpretation, the basic idea could be
adapted to other settings.
In our main technical result, we give a construction on algorithms which
interprets the rule of dependent choice. We consider this result to be of interest
in its own right: Though inspired by Spector’s bar recursor [27], our proof
of correctness does not appeal to any sort of choice or bar induction on the
metalevel, nor to any semantic properties such as continuity. Moreover, it
gives an explicit step-by-step construction of the underlying choice sequence,
something which is typically obscured in traditional approaches.
However, our primary motive is practical, and based on the following idea:
Many non-constructive proofs of existential statements in mathematics contain
a single instance of a strong non-constructive principle, such as choice or Zorn’s
lemma, and are otherwise computationally simple. Provided we have a clear
algorithmic interpretation of the strong principle, we can often convert this to
an algorithm for computing a witness to the theorem. We present a framework
in which this idea can be made precise.
As such, the content of this paper should be viewed on two levels. On the
one hand, we give a new computational interpretation of dependent choice
using sequential algorithms, which provides us with some new insight into
the computational content of classical analysis, and could be used to better
understand bar recursive programs as extracted in e.g. [18, 19]. On the other,
this can all be viewed as a single illustration of amuchmore general approach to
program extraction, which focuses on the intuitive representation of programs
as algorithms.
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It is important to emphasise that we do not consider ideas of this paper as
replacing traditional methods of program extraction such as proof interpreta-
tion! General techniqueswhich act on formalised proofs are essential if our goal
is to e.g. synthesise verified software. Our approach is more in line with that
of dynamical algebra [3], in which clever algorithms are sought to replace the
use of e.g. a maximal ideal in some existence proof, as in [29]. Our paper pro-
poses an approach for designing algorithms of this kind which is more closely
related to traditional proof interpretations, and may eventually lead to a better
understanding of the connection between dynamical algebra and techniques
such as the n.c.i. and the Dialectica interpretation.
1.1 A remark on terminology
Our use of the term ’sequential algorithm’ follows Gurevich [6], although our
notion of an algorithm ismuch simpler, andmight bemore accuratelydescribed
as an ’oracle transition system’. Our aim is simply togive aflexible andabove all
high-level characterisation of algorithms that can be viewed as some evolving
computation on a state. In particular, our focus is quite different fromsequential
algorithms [2] or dialog games [7] as seen in the context of the semantics of PCF.
1.2 Outline of paper
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the no-counterexample interpretation.
Sections 3-4 set up our framework, and in particular our notion of an oracle
sequential algorithm. We present our main technical result on algorithms - an
interpretation of the rule of dependent choice - in Section 5, and conclude, in
Section 6, with a detailed case study, inwhichwe consider the so-called ‘infinite
tape’ example.
2 The no-counterexample interpretation
We begin by introducing, in a rather informal setting, Kreisel’s famous no-
counterexample interpretation (henceforth abbreviated as the n.c.i). It should
be mentioned that while the n.c.i. is closely related to the combination of the
negative translation andGo¨del’s functional (or Dialectica) interpretation, in the
case of ∀∃∀-formulas, which we study here, the two coincide, and though we
use ideas from the Dialectica interpretation throughout the paper, we explain
these as and when we need them, and so a more detailed introduction to proof
interpretations and higher-order computation is not necessary.
Unlikemost works on the subject of proof interpretations, which fix a formal
type theory from the outset, we work in a simple mathematical setting of sets
X,Y,Z, . . . and functions f : X → Y between these sets. We will also talk
about functionals Φ : YX → Z i.e. maps which take functions as inputs, and
will later impose some conditions on functionals such as continuity. Usually
all this is formalised in some higher-order extension of arithmetic such as
the PAω of [28], which talk more generally about objects of arbitrary finite
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type. However, because we are concerned with high-level algorithms rather
than detailed general soundness theorems, an informal setting works well and
allows us a lot more flexibility.
Now, suppose we have a theorem A of the form
A :≡ (∀u ∈ U)(∃x ∈ X)(∀y ∈ Y)P(u, x, y).
where the predicate P(u, x, y) is taken to be decidable, which means that we
assume some encoding of objects u, x, y and a computable procedure which
determines the truth value of P(u, x, y).
In general, it is not possible to find a direct witness for the existential quan-
tifier ∃x. The usual example is given by the Kleene T-predicate:
(∀u ∈N)(∃x ∈N)(∀y ∈N)(T(u, u, x)∨ ¬T(u, u, y)).
Here, if we could compute a bound on the ∃x in terms of u, we would have
solved the halting problem. However, it is possible to reformulate such state-
ments so that they become computationally tractable. Let’s suppose that the
theorem A above is not true i.e. there is some u ∈ U such that
(∀x ∈ X)(∃y ∈ Y)¬P(u, x, y).
Then (by the axiom of choice for quantifier-free formulas) there would exist for
some u a ‘counterexample function’ f : X → Y satisfying
(∀x)¬P(u, x, f (x))
Therefore, negating a second time, we see that A is equivalent to the statement
An.c.i. that any counterexample function must fail, or in logical terms:
An.c.i. :≡ (∀u ∈ U,∀ f : X → Y)(∃x ∈ X)P(u, x, f (x)).
An explicit witness for the quantifier ∃x would then be given by a functional
Φ : U × YX → X which satisfies
(∀u, f : X → Y)P(u,Φ(u, f ), f (Φ(u, f ))).
It turns out that in very general circumstances it is possible to find such a
functional Φ which is computable in the oracle f . In our simple example of the
Halting problem, the n.c.i.-version of the theorem is just
(∀u, f :N→N)(∃x)(T(u, u, x)∨ ¬T(u, u, f (x)))
and this is realized by the functional defined as
Φ(u, f ) :=

0 if ¬T(u, u, f (0))
f (0) otherwise.
which can easily be computed by some suitable oracle Turing machine.
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Typically this phenomenon is made precise through a soundness theorem,
which states that whenever A is provable in some theory T then there is a
corresponding Φ in some subrecursive class of functionals F . In the case that
T is Peano arithmetic, a realizer for the n.c.i. of A can be found in Go¨del’s
System T of primitive recursive functionals of all finite type:
Theorem 2.1 (Kreisel). Suppose that (∀u)(∃x)(∀y)P(u, x, y) is provable in Peano
arithmetic, where P(u, x, y) is a quantifier-free formula. Then there is a term t of
System T such that (∀u, f )P(u, tu f , f (tu f )) is provable in System T.
Remark 2.2. Aproof of the theorem in its formhere is given in e.g. [8, Proposition
10.9]. However, Kreisel initially proved that the n.c.i. could be realized by
some α-recursive functional Φ for some α < ε0, which follows by applying
a normalization procedure to the term t in the above result. Naturally, the
theorem holds more generally for formulas of the form
(∃x1)(∀y1) . . . (∃xn)(∀yn)P(x1, y1, . . . , xn, yn)
which would be interpreted by a sequence of functionals Φ1, . . . ,Φn satisfying
(∀ f1, . . . , fn)P(Φ1( f ), f1(Φ1( f )), . . . ,Φn( f ), fn(Φ1( f ), . . . ,Φn( f )))
but in this article we stick to at most three quantifier alternations.
The n.c.i. gives us a connection between theorems of the form A ≡ (∀u ∈
U)(∃x ∈ X)(∀y ∈ Y)P(u, x, y) and computable functionals of type U × YX → X.
There are several ways in which the behaviour of such functionals can be
characterised. One which is particularly illuminating is the idea that, while A
states that an ideal object x exists, which satisfies P(u, x, y) for all y, An.c.i. states
that for any f an approximation to x exists, which satisfies P(u, x, y) only for
y = f (x). In this sense, Φ is a functional for computing approximations to non-
computable objects, and in practise, it is often the case that terms representing
Φ carry out some kind of learning, or trial-and-error procedure. The n.c.i.
has been studied from this perspective in a number of places, see for example
[9, 14, 21].
In this article, we focus on the relationship between theorems and sequential
algorithms. Instead of focusing on general soundness theorems which formally
produce e.g. α-recursive functionals or closed terms of System T, we establish
a connection between theorems and a kind of oracle transition system which
we will call an approximation algorithm:
Theorem
n.c.i.
↔ Approximation algorithm
The main results of the paper will be a handful of results which explore this
connection, and in particular establish constructions which act directly on al-
gorithms.
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3 Approximation algorithms
We begin by introducing, and carefully motivating, our notion of an approx-
imation algorithm. While this is essentially nothing more than a transition
system with oracle queries, there are several details and design choices that
need to be made. We start by outlining the very simple notion of a sequential
time algorithm.
Definition 3.1. A sequential algorithmA := (S, I,E,⊲) consists of:
• A set S of states.
• Subsets I,E ⊂ S of initial and end states.
• A partial function ⊲ : S→ S.
We write t = ⊲(s) inline as s ⊲ t.
Definition 3.2. A run inA is a sequence
s0 ⊲ s1 ⊲ . . . ⊲ sn
where we assume that si < E for i < n. We write s0 ⊲
∗ sn whenever there is a run
from s0 to sn. The element t is reachable from s if s ⊲
∗ t.
Definition 3.3. We say that s terminates and write s ↓ if there exists some t ∈ E
such that s ⊲∗ t. By our definition of a run, t must be the first element of E
reachable from s. We say thatA terminates if s ↓ for all s ∈ I.
So far, our definition essentially coincides with the notion of a sequential
time algorithm in Gurevich [6] (cf. Postulate 1), and is of course nothing more
than a simple deterministic transition system.
This already allows us to give clean, high level descriptions of sequential
processes: For instance, theEuclideanalgorithmcanbedescribed as the sequen-
tial algorithm A with S := N ×N, I := {(x, y) | x > y} and E := {(x, 0) | x ∈ N},
with transitions given by
(x, y)⊲ (y, x mod y).
While the algorithms of Gurevich obey further postulates e.g. states are struc-
tures to which only local changes are made and so on, we do not refine our
definition any further: Our priority here is not on a complete characterisation
of a sequential algorithm, but on devising a simple abstract model through
which the computational behaviour of certain non-constructive principles can
be clearly understood. However, we conjecture that were our definition to be
enhanced with further conditions along the lines of [6], most of what follows
could be adapted to the more restrictive setting.
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3.1 Input/output
In order to make explicit the idea that a sequential algorithm A computes a
function f : U → V, one needs to add some additional structure dealing with
input and output. We incorporate this into the following expanded definition,
which we call an explicit sequential algorithm.
Definition 3.4. An explicit sequential algorithm A := (S,E, ρ, π,⊲) of sort U,V
is a sequential algorithm which comes equipped with functions ρ : U → S and
π : S→ V, where input states are now a secondary notion defined as I := ρ(U).
We could have naturally restricted the domain of π to be E rather than
S. However, throughout this paper, π should be interpreted as a location in
the state, which will typically just be a projection, and as such, it just returns
whatever is currently in the output location, regardless of whether the state is
an end state or not. Moreover, algorithms associated to proofs are typically
characterised as ‘building’ some witness v ∈ V to an existential statement by
trial and error. Thus we want this to be explicitly part of the evolving state.
Definition 3.5. An explicit sequential algorithmA of sort U,V induces a partial
function fA : U → V in the obvious way:
fA(u) :=

π(t) if ρ(u) ⊲∗ t ∈ E
undefined otherwise
We say, conversely, that a partial function f : U → V is computed by a sequential
algorithmA if fA(u) = f (u) for all u ∈ U.
Proposition 3.6. IfA terminates then the partial function fA is total.
Example 3.7. The Euclidean algorithm can be characterised as an explicit se-
quential algorithm A of sort N × N, N by defining S := N × N, ρ(a, b) :=
(max(a, b),min(a, b)), π(x, y) := x, E := {(x, 0) | x ∈ N} and (x, y) ⊲ (y, x mod y).
The induced function fA returns the gcd of any pair of natural numbers: for
example, f (28, 72) would be computed as
(72, 28)⊲ (28, 16)⊲ (16, 12)⊲ (12, 4)⊲ (4, 0)
yielding f (28, 72) = π(4, 0) = 4, and the sequence 72, 28, 16, 12, 4 can be seen as
a succession of improving approximations to the gcd.
Note that our notion of an algorithm is extremely broad. In particular, we
make no assumptions about ⊲: as such, any function f : U → V is trivially
computed by the algorithm A := ({0, 1} × U × V, ρ, π,E,⊲) of sort U,V, where
ρ(u) = (0, u, v0) for some v0 ∈ V, π(b, u, v) := v, end states are those of form
(1, u, v) and (0, u, v) ⊲ (1, u, f (u)).
Naturally, though, our intention is that when a function is induced by some
algorithm, the latter gives some meaningful, though potentially high-level,
description of how that function is computed. We could make the notion of a
computable algorithm precise as follows:
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Definition 3.8. Anexplicit algorithmA := (S,E, ρ, π,⊲) of sortU,V is computable
if ρ, π and ⊲ are computable (resp. partial computable) functions relative to
some representations of U,V and S, and membership of E is decidable.
Proposition 3.9. IfA is computable then the function fA is partial computable.
Proof. We sketch the appropriate Turing machine: given some input u, we first
run a Turing machine which computes ρ, so that the initial state s0 := ρ(u) is
stored somewhere in the memory. We now simulate the algorithm itself. We
first run a Turing machine for E to check whether or not s0 ∈ E. If it is, then
we run π on input s0 and halt. Otherwise, it run a Turing machine for ⊲ to
compute s1 := ⊲(s0). We then repeat the above process. If fA(u) is defined, then
there is some t ∈ E such that ρ(u) ⊲∗ t. In which case, the Turing machine will
eventually halt with π(t) = f (u) in its memory. 
Computability issues do not play an important role in this paper. All of
the algorithms we discuss are computable, and all constructions on algorithms
will clearly preserve computability, and we do not try to make this precise.
For us, sequential algorithms are a way of describing functions, rather than a
characterisation of their computational strength.
3.2 Oracle queries
Explicit sequential algorithms in the usual sense allow us to define functions.
However, this paper is primarily concerned with functionals, which means that
we must now extend our definition of an algorithm to allow for oracle queries.
Technically speaking, we could accomplish this by including an oracle as some
parameter for our transition function ⊲. However, it will be more elegant and
meaningful to include oracles explicitly as part of the definition of an algorithm.
The following is a simple modification of Definition 3.4, and constitutes our
formulation of an oracle sequential algorithm:
Definition 3.10. An oracle sequential algorithm (OSA) of sort U,V,X,Y is given
by a tupleA := (R,Q,E, ρ, ξ, π,⊲), whose components are as follows:
• R is a set of registers (which were formerly our states), while states are
now defined by S := R × Y where Y := Y + {} for some object which
denotes an ‘empty register’. States will be written as
(r | o) where o =  or o ∈ Y,
and we define S := {(r | ) | r ∈ R};
• Q ⊆ S are query states;
• E ⊆ S are end states, where we assume that Q ∩ E = ∅;
• ρ : U → R is an input map and we define I := {ρu | u ∈ U} ⊆ S where
ρu := (ρ(u) | );
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• ξ : R→ X returns the current query;
• π : S→ V is an output map;
• ⊲ : S→ S is a partial function.
States of an OSA now come equipped with a ‘answer tape’, which is either
in an ‘empty’ state  or contains some y ∈ Y. They can also now be in a query
position, in which case they query the oracle on some value ξ(r) stored in r,
which writes the answer in the answer tape. We make this formal as follows:
Definition 3.11. An oracle for an OSAA of sortX,Y,U,V is a function f : X → Y.
For any oracle, there is a corresponding oracle transition ◮ f : Q→ S\S defined
by
(r | ) ◮ f (r | y) for y := f (ξ(r)).
The role of the empty element  is to differentiate ‘before’ and ‘after’ the
oracle transition. Of course, in a concrete computational model of our OSA, a
transition to an empty oracle tape need not mean deleting the contents of the
tape: it just refers to a marker which indicates that the contents of the tape are
no longer relevant, since we are anticipating a new oracle answer.
Definition 3.12. A run in an OSAA on the oracle f is a sequence of states
s0, s1, . . . , sn
where
• si < E for i < n,
• if si < Q then si ⊲ si+1,
• if si ∈ Q then si ◮ f si+1.
We write s ⊲∗
f
t whenever there is a run on f from s = to t, and say that t is
reachable from s on f .
Note that our notion of a run is similar to the interactive runs of Gurevich
[6, Section 8]. The following definitions and results all lift directly to oracle
sequential algorithms.
Definition 3.13. We say that s terminates on f , and write s ↓ f , if s ⊲
∗
f
t ∈ E. An
OSA terminates on some class F of oracles if ρu ↓ f for any f ∈ F and all u ∈ U.
We will often suppress f on both ⊲ f and s ↓ f when there is no risk of
ambiguity.
Definition 3.14. An OSA of sort X,Y,U,V induces a partial functional ΦA :
U × YX → V as follows:
ΦA(u, f ) :=

π(t) if ρu ⊲
∗
f
t ∈ E
undefined otherwise
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Proposition 3.15. IfA terminates on F then the partial functional ΦA is total when
restricted to U × F ⊆ U × YX.
Definition 3.16. An OSA of sort X,Y,U,V is computable if ρ, ξ, π and ⊲ are
computable (resp. partial computable) functions, and membership of both Q
and E is decidable, relative to some representations of X,Y,U,V.
Proposition 3.17. IfA is computable then the functional ΦA is computable (i.e. can
be computed via an oracle Turing machine).
Proof. A simple adaptation of the proof of 3.9. As before, after initialising the
input we simulate the run on ⊲ f . Now, in addition, at each state (r | ) the
Turingmachine needs to test whether or not (r | ) ∈ Q. If it is, then it computes
ξ(s) and writes it to the machine’s oracle query tape, and after receiving some
answer y sets the current state to (r | y). If s < Q then it computes s′ := ⊲(s)
as before. If ΦA(u, f ) is defined there is some t ∈ E such that ρu ⊲
∗ t, and then
the Turing machine when run on oracle f will halt with π(t) = ΦA(u, f ) in its
memory. 
Definition 3.18. Suppose thatA is an approximationalgorithmwhich terminates
on u and f i.e. there is a run
ρu := s0, s1, . . . , sn ∈ E
Let si0 , . . . , sim−1 denote the subsequence of those s j ∈ Q, and let x j := ξ(ri j ) where
si j = (ri j | ). We call the sequence x0, . . . , xm−1 the query sequence ofA on u and
f .
Proposition 3.19 (Continuity). Suppose thatA is terminating on F . Then for all u
and f ∈ F there exists a finite sequence x0, . . . , xm−1 such that for all g : X → Y
∀ j < m( f (x j) = g(x j))→ ΦA(u, f ) = ΦA(u, g).
Proof. Let x0, . . . , xm−1 be the query sequence of A on u and f . We prove
by induction on i that if s0, . . . , si is a run of A on u and f and s
′
0, . . . , s
′
i
a
run of A on g, then sk = s
′
k
for all k < i. For i = 0 this is trivial, since
s0 = ρu = s
′
0. Otherwise, assuming that si⊲ f si+1 and si = s
′
i
, we know that si < E,
so there are two possibilities. Either si < Q and so s
′
i+1
= ⊲(s′
i
) = ⊲(si) = si+1 or
s′
i+1
=◮g (si) =◮ f (si) = si+1 which follows from g(ξ[si]) = g(x j) = f (x j) = f (ξ[si])
for some x j in the query sequence. Therefore if ρu ⊲
∗
f
t ∈ E then also ρu ⊲
∗
g t ∈ E
and thus ΦA(u, f ) = π(t) = ΦA(u, g). 
Example 3.20. The functionalΦ :N×NN →N defined byΦ(n, f ) := maxi≤n f (i)
is computed by the following OSA: S := N × N, Q := {(i, n | ) | n > 0},
E := {(i, n | ) | n = 0}, ρ(n) := (0, n + 1), ξ(i, n) := n − 1 and π(i, n | o) := i, with
(i, n + 1 | y) ⊲ (max(i, y), n | ). For example, Φ(2, f ) would be computed as
(0, 3 | ) ◮ (0, 3 | y0) ⊲ (y0, 2 | ) ◮ (y0, 2 | y1) ⊲ (max(y0, y1), 1 | )
◮ (max(y0, y1), 1 | y2) ⊲ (max(y0, y1, y2), 0 | ) ∈ E
where y0, y1, y2 = f (2), f (1), f (0).
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4 Theorems and algorithms
We have introduced Kreisel’s no counterexample interpretation, and defined a
notion of an oracle sequential algorithm which computes functionals of n.c.i.
realizer type. We now make the connection between these concepts precise,
and give a number of definitions and results which develop it further.
While it is clear that we can view anOSA of sortU,X,X,Y as a realizer of the
n.c.i. of some formula (∀u ∈ U)(∃x ∈ X)(∀y ∈ Y)P(u, x, y) if ΦA : U × Y
X → X
satisfies (∀u ∈ U, f : X → Y)P(u,ΦA(u, f ), f (ΦA(u, f ))), we give a refinement
of an OSA which makes the connection slightly cleaner, and will be crucial in
Section 5.
Definition 4.1. LetA = (R,Q,E, ρ, ξ, π,⊲) be an OSA of sort U,X,X,Ywhere:
(i) π(r | o) = ξ(r);
(ii) E ⊆ S\S;
(iii) if (r | o) ⊲ (r′ | y) with y ∈ Y then o = y and ξ(r) = ξ(r′).
Then we callA an approximation algorithm of sort U,X,Y.
Intuitively, the first condition (i) combines the query and output locations
of the state, the second ensures that end states always have the form (r | y) for
y ∈ Y, and the third results in the following property:
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that ρu ⊲
∗
f
(r | o) for u ∈ U. Then if o ∈ Y then o = f (ξ(r)).
Proof. Induction on runs. The only run of length 1 is the single element ρu
and so the result trivially holds since ρu = (ρ(u) | ). Now suppose that
s, . . . , si, si+1 = (r | o) is a run. If si ∈ Q then si ◮ f (r | o) and so si = (r | )
and o = f (ξ(r)). Otherwise, si ⊲ (r | o) and either o = , in which case there
is nothing to prove, or o = y ∈ Y, in which case si = (r
′ | y) with ξ(r′) = ξ(r)
by the condition (iii). Since we assume inductively that y = f (ξ(r′)), we have
y = f (ξ(r)). 
Definition 4.3. Let P(u, x, y) be a predicate on U,X,Y. An approximation algo-
rithm (R,Q,E, ρ, ξ,⊲) of sort U,X,Y satisfies P on u ∈ U and f : X → Y if
ρu ⊲
∗
f (r | y) ∈ E implies P(u, ξ(r), y).
Theorem4.4. Suppose that the approximation algorithmA satisfies P(u, x, y) and ter-
minates on F . Then the induced functionalΦA satisfies the n.c.i. of ∀u∃x∀yP(u, x, y)
on F .
Proof. Take f ∈ F . Then ρu ⊲
∗
f
(r | y) with P(u, ξ(r), y). But ΦA(u, f ) := ξ(r) and
by Lemma 4.2 we have y = f (ξ(x)) = f (ΦA(u, f )). The result follows. 
Corollary 4.5. IfA is computable, realizes P and terminates, thenΦA is a computable
functional which satisfies the n.c.i. of ∀u∃x∀yP(u, x, y).
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The obvious question now is how dowe construct an appropriate algorithm
A from a given proof? It is here that our approach departs from the standard
pattern of
formal proof + soundness theorem 7→ realizing program
which guarantees a realizing term from any proof. Our aim is to use oracle
sequential algorithms to describe the operational behaviour of programswhich
realize the n.c.i. of theorems. To this end, rather than a full soundness proof, we
focus on interpreting key patterns which often appear in proofs. As stated at
the beginning, the idea is that a human being can produce simple algorithmic
descriptions of mathematically simple parts of a proof, and then appeal to a
number of formal constructions in order to deal with complicated parts of the
proof, and such a construction, which deals with dependent choice, is the main
result of the next section. Therefore the technique we illustrate in this paper is
better described as
informal proof + constructions on algorithms 7→ realizing algorithm
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is not possible to formally extract
algorithmic descriptions of realizing programs. Devices such as the Krivine
machine [15] have alreadybeendeveloped for this purpose,where the reduction
of extracted terms is animated through an abstract machine. More closely
related to thework here is the variant of the functional interpretationdeveloped
by the author in [23] which keeps track of case distinctions made by formally
extracted realizing terms in a global state. In the next section, we pause and
demonstrate how the reduction of type 2 terms in System T can be captured by
our sequential algorithms.
4.1 Functionals in System T
This section, which is inspired by a classic resultwhich can be found in Troelstra
[28], constitutes a short digression and can be skipped if desired. It contains a
sketched proof of the following result:
Proposition 4.6. Suppose thatA :≡ ∀u∃x∀yP(u, x, y) is provable inPeano arithmetic.
Then there exists a computable and terminating approximation algorithm A that
satisfies P, and which can be formally obtained from the proof of A.
As outlined in [8, Proposition 10.9], one can first use Go¨del’s functional
interpretation to extract a closed term t : (0 → 0) → 0 → 0 of System T which
realizes the n.c.i. of P i.e. ∀u, φ0→0P(u, tφu, φ(tφu)).
We define A of sort N,N,N as follows: Let R := {Q, C} × Tφ ×N, where S
and C are just symbols and Tφ denotes the set of all terms of System T of type 0
which contain a single free variable parameter, along the lines of [28, Theorem
2.3.9], we consider terms of the form φn¯ to be additional ‘oracle’ reducts, where
n¯ denotes the numeral representation of n ∈N.
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We now let query states be those of the form (Q, a, x | ) and end states those
of the form (Q, k¯, x | y), with ρ(u) := (C, tφu¯, 0) and ξ(z, a, x) := x. Finally, the
transition relation ⊲ is defined as:
(C, a, x | o) ⊲

(C, b, x | o) if a ≻ b
(Q, a, n | ) if the next reduct of a is an oracle reduct φn¯
(Q, a, n | ) if a = n¯
(Q, a, x | y) ⊲ (C, a[y¯/φn¯], x | y) where the next reduct of a is φn¯
Now, suppose that f : N→ N is some function, and we extend our reduction
strategy ≻ to ≻ f , so that it also acts on oracle reducts as φn¯ ≻ f m¯ for m = f (n).
We show that if a ≻ f b then for any state s = (C, a, x | o) we would have
s⊲∗
f
(C, b, x′ | o′). If a ≻ b via an non-oracle reduction this is obvious. Otherwise,
we would have
(C, a[φn¯], x | o) ⊲ (Q, a[φn¯], n | ) ◮ f (Q, a[φn¯], n | m) ⊲ (C, a[m¯/φn¯], n | m)
with m = f (n). By an argument similar to [28, Theorem 2.3.9], any term in Tφ
and so in particular tφu¯ would reduce via ≻ f to a normal form of type 0 i.e. a
numeral n¯. Thus we have
ρu = (C, tφu¯, 0 | ) ⊲
∗
f (C, n¯, x | o) ⊲ (Q, n¯, n | ) ◮ f (Q, n¯, n | y) ∈ E
where n¯ is the normal form of t and thus, considering t as a functional (N →
N)→ N in the full set-theoretic model of System T, we have n = t f u, m = f (n)
and thus P(u, n,m). Moreover, the algorithm is computable since the reduction
of a System T term relative to some strategy can be viewed as a computable
operation, given some encoding of terms.
4.2 Control flow graphs and mind-changes
We now introduce a number of auxiliary concepts can be used to enhance our
understanding of approximation algorithms. We begin with the notion of a
control flow graph, which is valid for any of the algorithm types we have
discussed in this section.
Definition 4.7 (Control flow graph). LetA be an algorithmwith states S,Ω a set
and π : S→ Ω a function.
• For a normal (non-oracle) sequential algorithm, a directed graph G =
(Ω,A) is is a control flow graph forA w.r.t. π if whenever
s0, s1, . . . , sn
is a run inA from some s0 ∈ I then (π(si), π(si+1)) ∈ A for all i < n.
• For an oracle sequential algorithm, the labelled directed graphG = (Ω,A∪
A′) is a control flow graph forA w.r.t. π if whenever
s0, s1, . . . , sn
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is a run in A on some oracle f : X → Y and some s0 ∈ IA then
(π(si), π(si+1)) ∈ A for all i < n with si < Q, and (π(si), π(si+1)) ∈ A
′ for
all i < n with si ∈ Q.
There is another useful concept which will apply to approximation algo-
rithms.
Definition 4.8. Suppose that A is an approximation algorithm terminating on
F .
• If x0, . . . , xm−1 is the query sequence of A on u and f , we say that A
requires m − 1 mind-changes on u and f .
• We say that A requires at most n mind-changes on F if it requires ≤ n
mind changes for any u, f ∈ F.
• We say thatA is descending onF w.r.t. ≻ if whenever s⊲t then ξ(s)  ξ(t).
4.3 Multiple oracles and redundant parameters
Later it will be helpful to consider algorithms which computes functionals of
type U ×YX
1
×YX2 → X. While we could just encode this as a functional of type
U × (Y1 × Y2)
X → X, for the purpose of efficiency and also intuition, it will be
helpful to consider two separate oracles which can be queried independently,
in which case we say that our algorithm has sort U,X, [Y1,Y2].
We do not give a rigorous definition of the resulting extension of our oracle
algorithms since this is fairly obvious. States would have the form C×U ×X×
Y1 × Y2 while for each oracle we require separate subsets Q1,Q2 ⊂ S of query
states with Q1 ∩ Q2 = ∅ and s ∈ Qi ⇒ yi[s] = . The second rule on oracle
transitions would extend to at least one of the yi[s] being nonempty. Finally,
therewould be two transition relations◮i: Qi → S corresponding to each oracle.
In some cases we will consider theorems of the form (∃x)(∀y)P(x, y), which
are not dependent on some outer parameter U. Formally, these will be in-
terpreted by OSAs of sort 1,X,Y, where 1 denotes some one element set (i.e.
terminal object).
4.4 Example: The least element principle
We now give a concrete example which illustrates all of the above phenomena.
LetQ(x) be some decidable predicate on the setX, and assume this is equipped
with a well-founded, decidable relation >. Then using classical logic plus
induction over >, we can prove the following minimum principle:
(∃u ∈ X)Q(u)→ (∃x ∈ X)(Q(x)∧ (∀y < x)¬Q(y)).
Now, this is constructively equivalent to the following formula in prenex form:
(∀u ∈ X)(∃x ∈ X)(∀y ∈ X)(Q(u)→ Q(x) ∧ (y < x→ ¬Q(y))︸                                    ︷︷                                    ︸
P(u,x,y)
).
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Let P(u, x, y) be defined as indicated, and let the approximation algorithm
A = (R,Q,E, ρ, ξ,⊲) of sort X,X,X be given as follows:
• R := {S, E} × X where S and E are symbols;
• Q consists of states of the form (S, x | );
• E contains states of the form (E, x | y);
• ρ(u) := (S, u) and ξ(c, x) := x;
together with the single transition
(S, x | y) ⊲

(S, y | ) if y < x ∧Q(y)
(E, x | y) otherwise.
Proposition 4.9. A satisfies P(u, x, y) and terminates.
Proof. IfAdoesnot terminate on someu, we couldgenerate an infinite sequence
u>u1 > u2 > . . . such that
(S, u | ) ⊲∗ω (S, ui | )
for all i, contradicting well-foundedness of >. To show that the algorithm
satisfies P, pick some u ∈ X and assume thatP(u) holds (else the result is trivial).
It is easy to show by induction on the run that whenever (S, u | ) ⊲∗ (S, x | )
then P(x) holds. But sinceA terminates, we end up in some end state (S, x | y)
with P(x) and y < x→ ¬Q(y). 
The above program is an animation of the standard solution to the n.c.i. of
the least element principle, which would be given by some lambda satisfying
the following recursive equation:
Φ( f , x) = if x > f x ∧Q( f x) then Φ( f , f x) else x.
Note that in general extracted terms are much more complicated than this,
and as such we could use our framework to produce much richer algorithmic
descriptions these terms, which abstract away inessential parts of the program
and focus on the salient features.
We can associate to this approximation algorithm a control flow graph,
which tracks the basic structure of the computation: We set Σ := {S, S′, E} and
define π : S→ Σ by
π(c, x | y) := c for c ∈ {S, E}, and π(S, x | ) := S′.
Then the directed graph G = (Ω,A ∪ A′), where SAS′, SAE and S′A′S, i.e.
?>=<89:;S′

?>=<89:;S
]]
// ?>=<89:;E
is a control flow graph forA. Moreover,A is descending w.r.t. > and requires
at most one mind change.
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4.5 The n.c.i in action: Extracting witnesses from non-constructive proofs
In this section we discuss a very simple proof pattern, in which some non-
constructive principle A is used to prove an existential statement ∃vQ(v). We
indicate howA can be replaced by its n.c.i. in the proof, and how an approxima-
tion algorithm for A can be turned into a sequential algorithm for computing
v. For simplicity we focus the case where A :≡ (∃x ∈ X)(∀y ∈ Y)P(x, y) for de-
cidable P. Our aim is not a comprehensive study of program extraction using
the n.c.i. (or closely related Dialectica interpretation). But our example covers
a great number of non-constructive proofs one finds in everyday mathematics,
particularly abstract algebra, in which one often a single instance of e.g. a max-
imal idea is combined with some elementary reasoning to prove the existence
of something concrete.
Theorem: There exists some v ∈ V such that Q(v) holds.
Proof pattern: Take a relevant instance ∃x ∈ X∀y ∈ YP(x, y) of our non-
constructive principle, and show that this combined with ∀v¬Q(v) leads to
a contradiction. 
Logically speaking, the body of the proof is the following implication:
∃x∀yP(x, y)∧ ∀v¬Q(v)→ ⊥
which is of course equivalent to
(∗) ∃x∀yP(x, y)→ ∃vQ(v)
Thus if there exists some x satisfying ∀yP(x, y) then we can infer ∃vQ(v). The
problem, computationally speaking, is that we cannot necessarily construct this
x. However, we can typically find a pair of functions f : X → Y and g : X → V
such that
(∗∗) ∀x
(
P(x, f (x))→ Q(g(x))
)
.
In fact, when (∗) is provable in e.g. Peano arithmetic, the functional interpreta-
tion guarantees that we are able to do so. Now supposing we are able to find a
functional Φ : YX → X satisfying
P(Φ f , f (Φ f )).
Then it follows that Q(v) holds for v := g(Φ( f )). We can give an algorithmic
version if this as follows.
Proposition 4.10. Suppose that A of sort 1,X,Y is an approximation machine that
terminates on F and satisfies P(x, y), and that f ∈ F and g : X → V satisfy (∗∗).
Then Q(v) holds for v := (g ◦ ξ)(r) where
ρ ⊲∗f (r | y) ∈ EA.
Proof. Straightforward: If ρ ⊲∗
f
(r | y) then P(x, y) holds for x = ξ(r) and y =
f (ξ(r)), and thus by (∗∗) we have Q(g(ξ(r))). 
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As such, if (r0 | ), (r1 | o1), . . . , (rk−1 | ok−1), (rk | y) ∈ E is a run inA on f we
can view the sequence
(g ◦ ξ)(r0), . . . , (g ◦ ξ)(rk)
as an algorithmic computation of a witness for ∃vQ(v).
5 An algorithmic interpretation of dependent choice
In this section we give our main technical result: A formal translation on algo-
rithms which acts as a computational interpretation of the rule of dependent
choice. This result is interesting in its own right: While inspired by Spec-
tor’s bar recursion, particularly the variant on finite sequences studied in [17],
our translation is not based on any predetermined formal system - everything
works in our very general setting where algorithms are just transition relations
which act on some state. In particular, we separate correctness and termination,
first showing that our algorithm for dependent choice is correctwhenever it ter-
minates, and only then showing that it indeed terminates for a reasonable class
of oracles. More importantly though, and unlike bar recursion, our interpreta-
tion gives a clear algorithmic meaning to dependent choice: Our construction
results in a sequential algorithm which clearly builds an approximation to a
choice sequence step-by-step, and can thus be used to better understand the
computational content of proofs in analysis or abstract algebra which use make
use of choice in some way. In particular, we are able to give a graph-theoretic
formulation of our algorithm, which described how the transformation acts on
call graphs. We give a concrete illustration of this in Section 6.
Let’s first outline the problem we want to solve. We need some notation:
Definition 5.1. For any set X, let X∗ denote the set of finite sequences over
elements of X, where [] ∈ X∗ is the empty sequence. The length of a ∈ X∗ is
denoted by |a|, and the extension of a with some x ∈ X resp. b ∈ X∗ is denoted
a :: x resp. a :: b. Given an infinite sequence α : XN and n ∈ N we define
[α](n) ∈ X∗ to be the initial segment of α of length n i.e. [α](n) := [α0, . . . , αn−1].
We aim to interpret the following rule of dependent choice restricted to Π1
formulas: If for some predicate P(u, x, y) we have
(∀u ∈ X∗)(∃x ∈ X)(∀y ∈ Y)P(u, x, y)
then we can infer
(∃α :N→ X)(∀n ∈N, y ∈ Y)P([α](n), αn, y).
Note that even for X = Y = N, simple classical logic combined with this rule
form of dependent choice is strong enough to give us arithmetical comprehen-
sion for Π1-formulas, and also simple formulations of Zorn’s lemma, single
instances of which are used to prove many strong analytic principles.
To interpret this rule in our framework of sequential algorithms, we mean
the following: Given an approximation algorithm A of sort X∗,X,Y satisfying
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P(u, x, y), can we construct, in a uniform way, an approximation algorithmAω
of sort 1,XN, [N,Y] which satisfies
Pω(α, [n, y]) :≡ P([α](n), αn, y).
Of course, we could just define Aω so that it does not terminate on any input,
in which case it trivially satisfies any formula! Therefore we also require the
following property: Whenever A terminates then Aω terminates under some
reasonable conditions. The latter will be established in Theorem 5.13. But first
to the definition ofAω:
Definition 5.2. Suppose we are given some approximation algorithm A =
(R,Q,E, ρ, ξ,⊲) of sort X∗,X,Y. We define Aω = (Rω,Q1,Q2,Eω, ρω, ξω,⊲ω)
of sort 1,XN, [N,Y] as follows:
• Rω := R
∗ × X∗. States will be written as (σ, a | o1, o2) for σ ∈ R
∗, a ∈ X∗,
o1 ∈N and o2 ∈ Y;
• ρω(1) := ([ρ([])], []) and thus the single initial state is ([ρ([])], [] | ,),
which we denote by ρω;
• Q1 comprises states of the form (σ :: r, [] | ,) with (r | ) ∈ Q;
• Q2 comprises states of the form (σ, [] | n,) with n < |σ|;
• Eω comprises states of the form ([], a | n, y);
• ξω(σ, a) := ξ
∗(σ) :: a :: 0 ∈ XN where ξ∗([σ0, . . . , σk−1]) := [ξ(σ0), . . . , ξ(σk−1)]
and 0 := 0, 0, . . ..
Finally, the transitions ⊲ω are given by three rule types:
(a) (σ, [] | n,) ⊲ω (σ :: ρ(ξ
∗(σ)), [] | ,);
(b) (σ :: r, a | n, y) ⊲ω (σ, ξ(r) :: a | n, y) if (r | y) ∈ E;
(c) (i) (σ :: r, [] | ,) ⊲ω (σ :: r
′, [] | ,) if (r | ) ⊲ (r′ | ),
(ii) (σ :: r, a | n, y) ⊲ω (σ :: r
′, [] | ,) if (r | y) ⊲ (r′ | ),
(iii) (σ :: r, a | n, y) ⊲ω (σ :: r
′, a | n, y) if (r | y) ⊲ (r′ | y).
Remark 5.3. Note that Aω has multiple oracles, as outlined in Section 4.3. In
particular, we denote the two oracle transitions by ◮i for i = 1, 2, where as usual
we suppress the dependency on the particular oracle.
Lemma 5.4. Aω is an approximation algorithm.
Proof. We only need to establish condition (iii) of Definition 4.1. There are two
transition rules to check: for (b) we have
ξω(σ :: r, a) = ξ
∗(σ) :: ξ(r) :: a = ξω(σ, ξ(r) :: a)
while for (ciii) we have
ξω(σ :: r, a) = ξ
∗(σ) :: ξ(r) :: a = ξ∗(σ) :: ξ(r′) :: a = ξω(σ :: r
′, a)
using the fact thatA is an approximation algorithm and hence ξ(r) = ξ(r′). 
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Lemma 5.5. IfA is computable then so isAω.
Proof. This is clear andwe only sketch the proof: Membership ofQ1,Q2 and Eω
only involves checking the lengths |σ| and |a| together with membership of Q.
Similarly, establishing which transition rule applies is a matter of lengths to-
gether with membership of E, and ⊲ω then only involves simple manipulations
of the state, potentially using the computable functions ρ and ξ, or the partial
computable transition relation ⊲. 
We now prove that wheneverA satisfies P, thenAω satisfies Pω. We do this
by induction on the run, and we first need a few lemmas.
Definition 5.6. We say that a transition acting on state (σ, a | o1, o2) has level m
if it either an oracle transition or an instance of rule (a), and |σ| = m, or it is an
instance of rules (b)-(c) and |σ| = m + 1.
Lemma 5.7. Define sσ := (σ, [] | ,) and fix some oracles for Aω. Suppose that
sσ ⊲
∗
ω (σ :: τ, a | o1, o2) where all transitions in the run have level ≥ |σ|. Then whenever
ξ∗(σ) = ξ∗(σ′) we have sσ′ ⊲
∗
ω (σ
′ :: τ, a | o1, o2).
Proof. Easy induction on the run. For the induction step, in the case of oracle
transitions, these can only depend on ξω(σ :: τ, a) and hence ξ
∗(σ), and similarly
for rule (a). For rules (b) and (c), since the level of the transition is ≥ |σ|wemust
have |τ| ≥ 1 and hence the transitions are independent of σ. 
Lemma 5.8. Fixing some oracles, suppose that the state (σ :: r, a | n, y) for (r | y) ∈ E
is reachable. Then P(ξ∗(σ), ξ(r), y).
Proof. We fix some reachable (σ :: r, a | n, y) with (r | y) ∈ E, and first prove a
simple yet bureaucratic auxiliary claim, namely that there is a partial function
fσ : X → Y such that if (σ :: r
′, [] | ,) for (r′ | ) ∈ Q is some intermediate state
on the run to (σ :: r, a | n, y), then (σ :: r′, [] | ,) ⊲∗ω (σ :: r
′, a′ | n′, fσ(ξ(r))) for
some a′ and n′.
To prove the claim, suppose that x ∈ X is such that (σ :: r′, [] | ,) ∈ Q1 for
some r′ with ξ(r′) = x. Then we must have (σ :: r′, [] | ,) ⊲∗ω (σ :: r
′, a′ | n′, y′)
for some a′, n′, y′, using transitions only of level ≥ |σ| + 1. To see this, note that
either
(σ :: r′, [] | ,) ◮1 (σ :: r
′, [] | n′,) ◮2 (σ :: r
′, [] | n′, y′)
for n′ < |σ| + 1, or
(σ :: r′, [] | ,) ◮1 (σ :: r
′, [] | n′,) ⊲ω (σ :: r
′ :: ρ(ξ∗(σ :: r′)), [] | ,)
and so at so at some point an instance of rule (b) must occur, and the first
instance would result in a state of the form (σ :: r′, a′ | n′, y′) having used only
transitions of level ≥ |σ| + 1.
Thus, we can set fσ(x) := y
′ for this y′, which is independent of our choice
of r′ satisfying ξ(r′) = x by Lemma 5.7, and undefined if there is no reachable
state (σ :: r′, [] | ,) ∈ Q1 with ξ(r
′) = x. This proves the claim.
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Now we utilise this function fσ to show that for any u ∈ X
∗, we have
(ρ(u) | ) ⊲∗ (r′ | y′) resp.(r | )
on oracle fσ, if and only if
(σ :: ρ(u), [] | ,) ⊲∗ω (σ :: r
′, a′ | n′, y′) resp.(σ :: r′, [] | ,).
for some a′, n′. But this is a simple induction on runs which follows by inspect-
ing rule type (c). The only interesting case is anoracle transition (r′ | ) ◮ (r′ | y′)
for (r′ | ) ∈ Q, but this is exactly what is covered by the claim.
We can now complete the proof: If (σ :: r, a | n, y) is reachablewemust, more
specifically, have
ρω(1) ⊲
∗
ω (σ :: ρ(ξ
∗(σ)), [] | ,) ⊲∗ω (σ :: r, a | n, y)
and thus (ρ(ξ∗(σ)) | ) ⊲∗ (r | y) ∈ E in A on fσ. But since we assume that A
satisfies Pwe have P(ξ∗(σ), ξ(r), y). 
Lemma 5.9. Suppose that the state (σ, a | n, y) is reachable. Then we have
|σ| ≤ n→ P([α](n), αn, y) for α := ξω(σ :: a).
Proof. Induction on the length of the run, fixing some oracles. The base case is
trivial, so let’s assume that ρω(1), . . . , s, (σ, a | n, y) is a run in A. Then the last
transition can only be an oracle transition on the second oracle, or an instance
of rule (b) or (ciii).
In the former case, we would have s = (σ, [] | n,) ◮2 (σ, [] | n, y) with
n < |σ|, and the result trivially holds. For rule (ciii), we would have s =
(σ′ :: r, a | n, y) ◮2 (σ
′ :: r′, a | n, y) with (r | y) ⊲ (r′ | y) and hence ξ(r) = ξ(r′), so
the result holds by induction. Finally, for rule (b), we have s = (σ :: r, a | n, y)
with (r | y) ∈ E and |σ| + 1 ≤ n → P([α](n), αn, y) for α := ξω(σ :: r :: a) = ξω(σ ::
ξ(r) :: a). But by Lemma 5.8 we must also have P(ξ∗(σ), ξ(r), y), and hence
|σ| = n→ P([α](n), αn, y), and we’re done. 
Theorem 5.10. Suppose thatA satisfies P. ThenAω satisfies Pω.
Proof. Fix some oracles forAω and suppose that ρω(1) ⊲
∗
ω ([], a | n, y) ∈ E. Then
by Lemma 5.9 we have 0 ≤ n→ P([α](n), αn, y) for α = ξω([], a) = a :: 0which is
just Pω(ξω([], a), [n, y]). 
We now turn to under what conditions our algorithm Aω actually termi-
nates, assumingA that does.
Lemma 5.11. Suppose thatA terminates. Define the predicate B(σ) on R∗ as follows:
B(σ) holds only if (σi | ) ∈ Q for all i < |σ| and it is not the case that
(σ, [] | ,) ⊲∗ω (σ, a | n, y) for some a, n, y.
Then B(σ) implies there exists some r ∈ R such that B(σ :: r).
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Proof. This is a simple adaptation of the argument already seen in Lemma 5.8.
If B(σ) holds then we must have
(σ, [] | ,) ◮1 (σ, [] | n,) ◮2 (σ :: ρ(ξ
∗(σ)), [] | ,)
with n ≥ |σ|. Now, if for all r with (r | ) ∈ Q we have ¬B(σ :: r), this would
imply that (σ :: r, [] | ,) ⊲∗ω (σ :: r, a | n, y) for some n, a, y dependent only on
ξ∗(σ :: r). Therefore there is an induced run (ρ(ξ∗(σ)) | ) ⊲∗ (r | y) ∈ E in A,
which gives rise to a corresponding run (σ :: ρ(ξ∗(σ)), [] | ,)⊲∗ω(σ :: r, a | n, y) in
Aω. But since (σ :: r, a | n, y)⊲ω (σ, ξ(r) :: a | n, y), this would contradict B(σ). 
Lemma 5.12. Suppose thatA terminates but thatAω does not terminate on oracles
φ1 : X
N →N and φ2 : X
N → Y. Then there exists some γ :N→ X such that
(∀N ∈N)(N ≤ φ1([γ](N) :: 0))
Proof. If Aω does not terminate then there is some (r | ) ∈ Q such that B([r]).
Applying Lemma 5.11 together with dependent choice on the meta-level, we
obtain a sequence F : N→ R such that for all N ∈ N, (FN | ) ∈ Q but it is not
the case that ([F](N), [] | ,) ⊲∗ω ([F](N), a | n, y).
In particular, we must have N ≤ φ1(ξω([F](N), [])), else ([F](N), [] | ,) ◮1
([F](N), [] | n,) ∈ Q2. Define γn := ξ(Fn) ∈ X. Then ξω([F](N), []) = [γ](N) :: 0,
and the result follows. 
Our main theorem on termination now follows directly from Lemma 5.12:
Theorem 5.13. Suppose thatA terminates. ThenAω terminates on F1 ⊂ X
N → N
and the full function space XN → Y, where
F1 := {φ : X
N → N | (∀γ)(∃N)(N < φ1([γ](N) :: 0))}
While F1 may not seem at first glace to be a particularly natural restriction,
note that any continuous φ1 is automatically a member of F1. To see this: if
some continuous φ1 takes an argument γ, then φ1(γ) depends only on some
finite initial segment [γ](n) of γ. Taking N := max(φ1(γ) + 1, n), we have
φ1([γ](N) :: 0) = φ1(γ) < φ1(γ) + 1 = N.
5.1 Understanding how choice sequences are built
While our main construction of Aω may seem quite involved, the idea is that
given an intelligent and meaningful input algorithm A, we are able to clearly
see how approximations to choice sequences are build byAω. In particular, the
concepts introduced in Section 4.2 can both be lifted to this setting.
Theorem 5.14. Suppose that G = (Ω,A ∪ A′) is a control flow graph for A w.r.t.
π : S→ Ω, and letΩI := π(ρ(X
∗)) and ΩE := π(E). We define
Σ := {⋆} + ((N +N) ×Ω)
whereN andN are two copies ofN, and the directed graph Gω := (Σ,B ∪ B
′) by
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1. if pAq then (n, p)B(n, q);
2. if pA′q then:
• (n, p)B′(n, p);
• (n, p)B′(n, q);
• (n, p)B(n+ 1, u) for all u ∈ ΩI
• (n + 1, u)B(n, q) for u ∈ ΩE;
3. (0, u)B⋆ for u ∈ ΩE.
Finally, let πω be given by
πω(σ :: r, a | o1, o2) :=

(|σ|, π(r | o2)) if o1 ∈N, o2 = 
(|σ|, π(r | o2)) otherwise
πω([], a | o1, o2) = ⋆
Then Gω is a control flow graph forAω w.r.t πω.
Proof. Suppose that ρω(1), . . . , s, t is a run in Aω. If s ⊲ω t by rule type (c) then
πω(s) = (n, p) and πω(t) = (n, q) for pAq and some n ∈N, and thus (n, p)B(n, q).
If s ⊲ω t by rule type (b), there are two cases. Either πω(s) = (n + 1, u)
for u ∈ ΩE, in which case πω(t) = (n, q) where pA
′q for some p, and thus
(n + 1, u)B(n, q). Or πω(s) = (0, u) for u ∈ ΩE, in which case π(t) = ⋆ and so
(0, u)B⋆.
If s ◮1 t, then πω(s) = (n, p) where pA
′q for some q and πω(t) = (n, p), and we
have (n, p)B′(n, p).
If s ⊲ω t by rule type (a), then s must be the result of an oracle query from
some s′ ∈ Q1 and thusπω(s) = (n, p)where pA
′q for some q. Butπω(t) = (n + 1, u)
for some u ∈ ΩI, and (n, p)B(n+ 1, u).
Finally, if s ◮2 t then smust be the result of an oracle query fromsome s
′ ∈ Q1
and thus πω(s) = (n, p). But πω(t) = (n, q) where pA
′q and thus (n, p)B′(n, q). 
We can also characterise how mind changes work for choice sequences.
Theorem 5.15. Suppose that A is descending w.r.t. (W,≻). Define the relation ≻ω
on X∗ by
• [x0, . . . , xk−1] ≻ω [x0, . . . , xk, x] for x ∈ X;
• [x0, . . . , xi−1, x, . . . , xk−1] ≻ω [x0, . . . , xi−1, y] for x ≻ y.
Extend this to a relation on XN by setting α ≻ω β iff α = a :: 0 and β = b :: 0 with
a ≻ω b. ThenAω is descending w.r.t. ≻ω.
Proof. This follows easily by inspecting each of the rule types. 
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Producing explicit upper bounds on mind changes is a little more difficult:
even ifAmakes at most one mind change,Aω could make unbounded many.
However, if we restrict the first oracle so thatAω only considers registers R
∗ of
length at most N, we obtain some simple bounds.
For example, suppose that A terminates and requires at most h(|u|) mind
changes on input u ∈ X∗, and that F N
1
:= {φ1 : X
N → N (∀γ)(N < φ1([γ](N) ::
0))0}. ThenAω terminates and requires at most
N∑
j=0
j∏
i=0
h(i)
calls to the first oracle, and at most
N∏
i=0
h(i)
calls to the second, when run on φ1 ∈ F
N
1
. We leave these as claims without
proofs, since we do not want to go into the messy details: We simply wanted
to give a sense of what could be obtained with further analysis.
6 Case study: The infinite tape
We conclude the article with a concrete example, which captures all of the ideas
presented in the previous section, and moreover illustrates the approach to
program extraction in general we outlined in Section 4. Our example is the
following:
Theorem 6.1. Given some infinite sequence of booleans b ∈ {0, 1}N, for any N ∈ N
there is a constant subsequence bv0 , . . . , bvN−1 of length N.
This is the so-called ’infinite tape’ example, and was chosen due it its sim-
plicity, and the fact that its constructive content has been studied in several
places. Our formulation is most closely related to that of Seisenberger [26, Sec-
tion 3]: We will analyse a variant of the proof given there, which is adapted so
that dependent choice is used in its rule form. Note that dependent choice is of
course not needed to prove Theorem 6.1, which can be formalised in arithmetic
without recourse to set theoretic axioms. Nevertheless, similarly to [26], our
analysis here usesAω in a weak way, finitary way, and thus produces a simple
program which could be formalised using primitive recursion.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. By dependent choice, construct an increasing function α :
N→ N as follows: Suppose α0, . . . , αn−1 has already been chosen. Either there
exists some i > αn−1 with bi = 0, in which case define αn := i, or bi = 1 for all
i > αn−1, in which case define αn := αn−1 + 1. Then α is a monotone function
such that, for any n ∈N,
bαn = 1→ ∀k ≥ αn(bk = 1).
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Now either bα0 = . . . = bαN−1 = 0, or there is some n < N with bαn = 1, in which
case bαn = bαn+1 = . . . = bαn+N−1 = 1. Either way, we have found a constant
subsequence of length N. 
The proof above is characteristic of many proofs which use dependent
choice, and has exactly the kind of structure which lends itself to our ap-
proach: The instance of choice is essentially the only difficult non-constructive
feature of the proof, and following the pattern presented in Section 4.5 we can
interpret the surrounding reasoning fairly straightforwardly, and without re-
course to any complicated machinery. Then, utilising our construction of the
previous section, we obtain an elegant and transparent algorithm which finds
the required constant subsequence by building an approximation to the choice
sequence used in the classical proof.
6.1 The structure of the proof
Webeginby showing that theproof of Theorem6.1 fits the basic patternoutlined
in Section 4.5. First, we fix the input data for the theorem, namely a sequence
b ∈ {0, 1}N and a number N ∈ N as a global parameters. We then define the
decidable predicate P onN∗ ×N ×N as
P([u0, . . . , un−1], x, y) :≡ un−1 < x ∧ ((bx = 1 ∧ x ≤ y)→ by = 1).
where for P([], x, y) we omit the conjunct un−1 < j, and the decidable predicate
Q onN∗ as
Q(v) := |v| = N ∧ ∀i < N(vi < vi+1 ∧ bvi = bvi+1)
Note that if v satisfies Q(v) then it gives us our constant subsequence of length
N, and hence Theorem 6.1 is just the statement (∃v ∈ N∗)Q(v). The formal
structure of our proof can now be given precisely as the implication
(∗) (∃α :N→N)(∀n, y ∈N)P([α](n), αn, y)→ (∃v ∈N
∗)Q(v).
To see this, note that by the premise of (∗) there exists a sequence α satisfying
αn−1 < αn ∧ ((bαn = 1 ∧ αn ≤ y)→ by = 1)
for all n, y. Either bα0 = . . . = bαN−1 = 0, in which case since α0 < α1 < . . . < αN−1
we can set v := [α0, . . . , αN−1], or there is somem < N such that bαm = 1, in which
case bαm = bαm+1 = . . . = bαm+N−1 = 1 and we can set v := [αm, αm + 1, . . . , αm +
N − 1].
6.2 Interpreting the implication
Referring back to the discussion in Section 4.5, our next step is to find a pair of
functions f :NN →N ×N and g :NN →N∗ such that
(∗∗) (∀α)(P([α]( f1(α)), α f1(α), f2(α))→ Q(g(α)),
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where fi denotes the ith projection of f . The function f characterises ‘howmuch’
of the choice sequence α we actually need, while g tells us how to convert this
information into a witness for the theorem. Giving these functions is rather
simple, since they can essentially be read of from the discussion in Section 6.1.
In short, we only need our α to satisfy P([α](n), αn, y) up to n := N − 1 and
y := αm + N − 1 where m < N is such that bαm = 1. However, we need to be a
little careful here: in order to ensure that our choice sequence is valid not just
for these points but for everything up to these points we should incorporate a
bounded search into our functions as follows:
Lemma 6.2. Let f and g be defined as follows:
f1(α) := least n < N s.t. ¬(αn−1 < αn) ∨ bαn = 1, else N − 1
f2(α) := if bαn = 1 then least αn ≤ y ≤ αn +N − 1 s.t. by = 0, else αn +N − 1
g(α) := [αn, αn + 1, . . . , αn +N − 1] if bαn = 1, else [α0, . . . , αN−1]
where n := f1(α) in the definitions of f2(α) and g(α). Then f and g satisfy (∗∗).
Proof. This is just a simple reformulation of the argument in Section 6.1. Set
n := f1(α). There are two cases. Suppose that bαn = 1, but there is some
αn ≤ y ≤ αn + N − 1 such that by = 0. If this were the case, then f2(α) would
return this y, but P([α](n), αn, y) would then be false, a contradiction. Therefore
it must be the case that by = 1 for all αn ≤ y ≤ αn + N − 1, in which case Q(v)
holds.
On the other hand, suppose that bαn = 0. If ¬(αn−1 < αn) then this would
contradict P([α](n), αn, f2(α)), and thus it must be the case that for all n < N we
have (αn−1 < αn) ∧ bαn = 0, and thus Q(v) holds. 
The functions defined in Lemma 6.2, though not entirely trivial, are little
more than bounded searches which check very basic properties of α, and so in
particular their algorithmic behaviour is clear. Thus, referring to Proposition
4.10, in order to obtain a full procedure which computes a witness v, it remains
to find an approximation machine which satisfies P([α](n), αn, y).
6.3 Interpreting dependent choice
We now appeal to the machinery of Section 5 to construct a machine which
terminates and satisfies P([α](n)). For the latter property, it is enough by The-
orem 5.10 to construct a machine A which satisfies P(u, x, y), and provided A
terminates, termination of Aω follows from Theorem 5.13 and the fact that f1
as defined in Lemma 6.2 is clearly continuous (in fact, it only ever looks at the
first N elements of its input α).
So our challenge is to find a terminating machineA of sortN∗,N,Nwhich
satisfies P(u, x, y). But this is, again, rather straightforward. Intuitively: Given
some input u we first try x := un−1 + 1. Given some y returned by the oracle,
P(u, x, y) then holds unless bx = 1 ∧ x ≤ y ∧ by = 0. But then taking x := y we
trivially have P(u, x, y′) for any subsequent oracle answer y′, since x > un−1 and
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bx = 0 (for the simpler case |u| = 0 we just take x := 0 for our first attempt). We
now want to capture this idea as an approximation algorithm, which we can
do by adapting that of Section 4.4: LetA be given by:
• R := {S, E1, E2} ×N for symbols S and E;
• Q consists of states of the form (S/E1, x | );
• E consists of states of the form (Ei, x | y);
• ρ(u) := (S, un−1 + 1) with ρ([]) := (S, 0) and ξ(c, x) := x,
together with the transition
(S, x | y) ⊲

(E1, y | ) if bx = 1 ∧ x ≤ y ∧ by = 0
(E2, x | y) otherwise
Lemma 6.3. A satisfies P(u, x, y) and terminates.
Proof. We have (S, un−1 + 1 | ) ◮ (S, un−1 + 1 | y) and there are two possibilities.
Either bun−1+1 = 1∧un−1+ 1 ≤ y→ by = 1 and (S, un−1 + 1 | y)⊲ (E2, un−1 + 1 | y) ∈
E, andwe have P(u, un−1+1, y) by definition, or bun−1+1 = 1∧un−1+1 ≤ y∧by = 0
and (S, un−1 + 1 | y) ⊲ (E1, y | ) ◮ (E1, y | y
′) and P(u, y, y′) holds since un−1 < y
and by = 0. Similar but easier for u = []. 
We can now, in a single step, construct a machine which constructs our
choice sequence.
Theorem 6.4. LetAω of sort 1,N
N, [N,N] be defined by
• Rω := ({S, E1, E2} ×N)
∗ ×N∗;
• ρ1 := ([(S, 0)], [] | ,);
• Q1 comprises states of the form (σ :: (S/E1, x), [] | ,);
• Q2 comprises states of the form (σ, [] | n,) with n < |σ|;
• E comprises states of the form ([], a | n, y);
• ξω(σ, a) := σ2 :: a :: 0 where σ2 ∈N
∗ is the second projection of σ
with transitions given by
(a) (σ :: (c, x), [] | n,) ⊲ω (σ :: (c, x) :: (S, x + 1), [] | ,);
(b) (σ :: (Ei, x), a | n, y) ⊲ω (σ, x :: a | n, y);
(c) (σ :: (S, x), a | n, y) ⊲ω

(σ :: (E1, y), [] | ,) if bx = 1 ∧ x ≤ y ∧ by = 0
(σ :: (E2, x), a | n, y) otherwise
ThenAω satisfies P([α](n), αn, y).
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Proof. By Lemma 6.3 combined with Theorem 5.10. 
We are now able to give a clear, algorithmic interpretation of our proof of
Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.5. Suppose thatAω is run on f1 and f2 as defined in Lemma 6.2. Then
([(S, 0)], [] | ,) ⊲∗ω ([], a | n, y)
where for α := a :: 0 we have that bαn = 1 implies bαn = bαn+1 = . . . = bαn+N−1 and
bαn = 0 implies α0 < . . . , αN−1 and bα0 = . . . = bαN−1 .
Proof. Termination of Aω on f1 follows from continuity of f1 combined with
Theorem 5.13. The rest follows from Proposition 4.10 and Lemma 6.2. 
Theorem 6.5 was obtained using a combination of intuition (in working
out the functions f1, f2 and g together with the algorithm A) and theory (the
application of Theorems 5.10 and 5.13). The resulting procedure for computing
a constant subsequence of b has a clear description as a sequential algorithm
which builds the underlying choice sequence.
We now discuss some of the additional concepts we introduced in Section
4.2. Similarly to Section 4.4, we can construct a simple control flow graph forA:
Let Σ := {S, S′, E, E′} and define σ(S, x | ) := S′, σ(S, x | y) := S, σ(E1, x | ) := E
′
and σ(Ei, x | y) := E. Then the directed graph G = (Ω,A ∪ A
′) with SAE, SAE′,
S′A′S and E′A′E i.e.
?>=<89:;S′ //?>=<89:;S ::// ?>=<89:;E′ // ?>=<89:;E
is a control flow graph forA relative to σ. Implementing the construction given
in Theorem 5.14, we obtain the following infinite control flow graphGω forAω:
   
?>=<89:;1, S′
OO
  
?>=<89:;1, S′
OO
  
?>=<89:;1, S′
OO
  
?>=<89:;1, S′
OO
  ?>=<89:;1, S′
OO
?>=<89:;1, S
99
// ?>=<89:;1, E′
OO
?>=<89:;1, E

?>=<89:;1, S′
OO
?>=<89:;1, S
99
// ?>=<89:;1, E′
OO
?>=<89:;1, E

?>=<89:;0, S′
OO
**
?>=<89:;0, S′
OO
**?>=<89:;0, S′
OO
?>=<89:;0, S 77// ?>=<89:;0, E′
OO
?>=<89:;0, E

⋆
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Each transition in the algorithm Aω corresponds to an edge in this graph: At
each node we have a current approximation α to our choice sequence, and
decisions on which edge to follow are based on simple calculations involving
α and b.
We conclude by giving some concrete examples of how the computation
behaves below:
Example 6.6 (N = 2 and b = 0, 1, 1, . . .). In the following, α denotes ξω(σ, []) for
the current state:
([(S, 0)], [] | ,) ◮1 ([(S, 0)], [] | 1,) ¬(α0 < α1)
⊲ω ([(S, 0), (S, 1)], [] | ,) 1 ≥ |σ|
◮1 ([(S, 0), (S, 1)], [] | 1,) bα1 = b1 = 1
◮2 ([(S, 0), (S, 1)], [] | 1, 2) 1 < |σ| and b1 = b2 = 1
⊲ω ([(S, 0), (E2, 1)], [] | 1, 2) b1 = 1 ∧ 1 ≤ 2→ b2 = 1
⊲ω ([(S, 0)], [1] | 1, 2)
⊲ω ([(E2, 0)], [1] | 1, 2) b0 = 1 ∧ 0 ≤ 1→ b1 = 1
⊲ω ([], [0, 1] | 1, 2)
We have bα1 = b1 = 1 and so b1 = b2 = 1, and the algorithm traces the following
path through Gω:
?>=<89:;1, S′
  
?>=<89:;1, S′ ?>=<89:;1, S′ ?>=<89:;1, S′
?>=<89:;1, S′
OO
?>=<89:;1, S
99
?>=<89:;1, E′ ?>=<89:;1, E

?>=<89:;1, S′ ?>=<89:;1, S ?>=<89:;1, E′ ?>=<89:;1, E
?>=<89:;0, S′
OO
?>=<89:;0, S′
?>=<89:;0, S′
OO
?>=<89:;0, S 77?>=<89:;0, E′ ?>=<89:;0, E

⋆
Example 6.7 (N = 2 and b = 1, 0, 1, 0, . . .). In the following, α denotes ξω(σ, []) for
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the current state:
([(S, 0)], [] | ,) ◮1 ([(S, 0)], [] | 0,) bα0 = b0 = 1
◮2 ([(S, 0)], [] | 0, 1) 0 < |σ| and b1 = 0
⊲ω ([(E1, 1)], [] | ,) b0 = 1 ∧ b1 = 0
◮1 ([(E1, 1)], [] | 1,) ¬(α0 < α1)
⊲ω ([(E1, 1), (S, 2)], [] | ,) ¬(1 < |σ|)
◮1 ([(E1, 1), (S, 2)], [] | 1,) bα1 = b2 = 1
◮2 ([(E1, 1), (S, 2)], [] | 1, 3) 1 < |σ| and b3 = 0
⊲ω ([(E1, 1), (E1, 3)], [] | ,) b2 = 1 ∧ 2 ≤ 3 ∧ b3 = 0
◮1 ([(E1, 1), (E1, 3)], [] | 1,)
◮2 ([(E1, 1), (E1, 3)], [] | 1, 4) 1 < |σ|
⊲ω ([(E1, 1)], [3] | 1, 4)
⊲ω ([], [1, 3] | 1, 4)
We have bα1 = b3 = 0 and so b1 = b3 = 0, and the algorithm traces the following
path through Gω:
?>=<89:;1, S′ ?>=<89:;1, S′ ?>=<89:;1, S′
  
?>=<89:;1, S′
  ?>=<89:;1, S′ ?>=<89:;1, S ?>=<89:;1, E′ ?>=<89:;1, E ?>=<89:;1, S′
OO
?>=<89:;1, S // ?>=<89:;1, E′
OO
?>=<89:;1, E

?>=<89:;0, S′
**
?>=<89:;0, S′
OO
?>=<89:;0, S′
OO
?>=<89:;0, S // ?>=<89:;0, E′
OO
?>=<89:;0, E

⋆
Note that the second example demonstrates that our program is not just
a blind search: The smallest initial segment of b which contains a constant
subsequence is that of length 3 i.e. b0 = b2 = 1, but our algorithm examines the
initial segment of length 4.
In fact, our algorithm initially tries to find a consecutive subsequence bi =
bi+1 = . . . = bi+N−1 = 1. If there is some i ≤ j < i + N with b j = 0 then it
proposes b j = b j+1 = . . . = b j+N−1 = 1, and so on. At some point, it either
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finds a consecutive sequence of constant value 1, or stops after N failures
with a (not necessarily consecutive) subsequence of constant value 0. This is
essentially the same as the program extracted in [26], and demonstrates that
proof theoretic methods for extracting programs from dependent choice yield
non-trivial algorithms.
7 Concluding remarks
As we have emphasised from the start, we consider this paper more than just
a novel computational interpretation of the axiom of choice: It is a first step
towards a new way of looking at program extraction, which emphasises the
high level description of programs as algorithms. As such, there are many
directions for future research, and we conclude by mentioning a few of these.
The most immediate application of the ideas presented here would be to
study some non-trivial mathematical theorems using sequential algorithms.
An obvious candidate would be the infinite Ramsey theorem for pairs, the
computational content of which has already been studied in [13] and [19] using
variants of bar recursion. Here, the construction of Section 5 would essen-
tially play the role of building approximations to the so-called Erdo˝s/Rado tree
used to prove the theorem in [4], and our algorithmic framework would hope-
fully give a clear description of how the resulting approximations to pairwise
monochromatic subsets are built in a sequential manner.
It would be interesting to explore refinements and extensions of the con-
struction developed in Section 5. For the case of countable (i.e. non-dependent)
choice, a non-sequential variant of our algorithm analogous to the symmetric
variant of bar recursion studied in [20] would bemore efficient, andwould also
have the advantage that it could be extended to choice over arbitrary discrete
structures, as in Section 6 of [20]. More interesting would be the prospect of
generalising our construction to choice over non-discrete spaces by working
with some countable basis for that space. Model theoretic issues of this kind,
which would be tricky to represent in a formal theory like System T, could
perhaps be more smoothly managed in our more informal setting.
Finally, a much broader and more challenging problemwould be to explore
the connection, already hinted at in the introduction, between our algorithmic
construction of choice sequences and techniques found in dynamical algebra.
A recurring theme in the latter is the development of algorithms which mimic
the use of Zorn’s lemma. These algorithms are typically devised without the
rigorous application of proof theoretic techniques, and are often given illumi-
nating diagrammatic descriptions, as in e.g. [25, Section 6] and [29, Section 3].
It would be fascinating to apply the techniques of Section 5 to concrete case
studies in abstract algebra, particularly the graphical representation given in
Theorem 5.14, to see to what extent they resemble existing algorithms.
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